3.06.2010

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The most comprehensive coverage on the construction of Statutes. It includes parts of statutes,Extrinsic-Aids,Intrinsic aids, Reading down, Amendments,Repeals,codifications,Quasi-Judicial agencies,Non-obstante clause,Mandatory/Declatory provisions,Tax ,Beneficial, Criminal,Fiscal Statute's Interpretation and sub-ordinate legislations.Besides it contains the Rules of Interpretation and the Role of Judiciary.Citations are in abundance.



Sunday, June 20, 2010

Contd..

The Rule explained by Benion
 The law is thus stated in Bennion on Statutory Interpretation 2nd edition, 1992, at pp 860/3: 
“(1) For the elusdem ,generis principle to apply there must be a sufficient indicatation of a category that can properly be described as a class or genus, even though not specified as such in the enactment. Furthermore the genus must be narrower than the general words it is said to regulate. 
(2) The nature of the genus is gathered by implication from the express words which suggest it (in this Code referred to as the genus-describing terms). Usually these consist of a list or string of substantives or adjectives (in the Code referred to as the generic string).... 
“The ejusdem generis principle may apply where one term only establishes the genus, though in such cases the presumption favouring the principle is weakened because of the dfficulty of discerning a genus ... a rule that two or more genus-describing words are always required would be too rigid The question is invariably one of the intention conveyed by the entirety of the passage, and there can be no absolute rule.... It is true that the mention of one genus describing term only may make it more difficult to arrive at the nature of the genus...” 
 In the case referred to by Asquith J in Allen v. Emmerson, (Anderson v. Anderson) Rigby LJ said (at p. 755) :-
“In modern times I think greater care has been taken in the application of the doctrine [of ejusdem generis ] but the doctrine  itself as laid down by great judges from time to time has never been varied; it has been one doctrine throughout. The main principle upon which you must proceed is, to give all the words their common meaning; you are not just fled in taking away from them their common meaning, unless you can find something reasonably plain upon the face of the document itself to show that they are not used with that meaning, and the mere fact that general words follow specific words is certainly not enough.” Royal Dublin Society v. Revenue Commissioners [1999] IESC 45; [2000] 1 IR 270 (19th May, 1999)

Ejusdem Generis :Principle:Re-explaned
The
 ejusdem generis , or "of the same genus" rule, is similar though narrower than the more general rule of noscitur a sociis. It operates where a broad or open-ended term appears following a series of more restrictive terms in the text of a  statute . Where the terms listed are similar enough to constitute a class or genus, the courts will presume, in interpreting the general words that follow, that they are intended to apply only to things of the same genus as the particular items listed. Bennion defines the ejusdem generis rule as,

"a principle of construction whereby wide words associated in the text with more limited words are taken to be restricted by implication to matters of the same limited character."
 The
 ejusdem generis rule was applied by O'Higgins J in The People (DPP) v Farrell , in the construction of section 30 of the Offences Against the State Act, 1939 . It was argued that the detention of the applicant in a garda car for a period of hours during the course of his questioning was unlawful and that his subsequent detention in a garda station was therefore also unlawful. The legality of the detention turned on whether a garda car could be regarded as a "convenient place" in accordance with the legislation. O'Higgins J considered that it could not, since the ejusdem generis rule required that the term be construed in the light of the other places of detention listed: "Garda Síochána Station, a prison, or some other convenient place". The rule required, at a minimum, that "other convenient place" should be a building of some kind.
 In
 HMIL Limited (Formerly Hibernia Meats International Ltd) v Minister For Agriculture And Food, the ejusdem generis rule was applied along with the noscitur a sociis rule. Barr J considered that a provision listing "other scraps left over from cutting or boning" at the end of a list of more specific items - bones, cartilages - was "an apposite illustration of the ejusdem generis principle in operation." He found that, according to the rule, "other scraps" should be interpreted as including all unspecified items which were not fit for human consumption."
 More recently, the presumption was applied in the High Court by Barr J in
 Royal Dublin Society v Revenue Commissioners. Barr J held that section 7 of the Excise Act, 1835 , which allowed the Revenue Commissioners to grant a liquor licence to " ... a theatre or other place of public entertainment" was a provision to which the ejusdem generis rule applied. He found that there was nothing in the Act to suggest that "other place of public entertainment" was meant in a wider sense to that applicable to "theatre" and that therefore it should be interpreted only as referring to places of public entertainment which were similar to, or within the same genus as, "theatre", in other words to "a performance for the benefit of the public with a defined time frame and where seating is provided for patrons."
 

The ejusdem generis rule will not apply where there is a list of items which do not constitute a genus, or where only one item is listed. In Kielthy v Ascon Ltd it was emphasised by O Dalaigh CJ that the ejusdem generis rule could only apply where antecedent categories establish a genus. He held that this was not the case where, as in the provision to be interpreted by the court, the general words were preceded by the enumeration of only one category. In Dublin Corporation v Dublin Cinemas Ltd it was held that a list of words in a  statute which included playgrounds, recreation grounds and "any building adapted for use as a shop" was too broad and included items which were too incongruous to constitute a genus, and that therefore the ejusdem generis rule did not apply.
 

The courts will also refuse to apply ejusdem generis where a statute contains general words, which are then followed by a list of particular items: in such cases the list of items is not regarded as limiting. In Application of Quinn , Griffin J pointed out the limitations of ejusdem generis , and emphasised that it was a presumption rather than a rule: "...the ejusdem generis rule is one to be applied with caution as it is a mere presumption which applies in the absence of any other indications of the legislature." He found that the ejusdem generis presumption did not apply to the construction of section 2 of the Public Dance Halls Act, 1935, since the general words preceded the particular words, rather than followed them.
  

Presumption that Parliament does not take away the Right to Approach Courts

A passages in de Smith Woolf and Jowell on "Judicial Review of Administrative Action", which is of course the recently published 5th edition of Professor de Smith's distinguished book, edited and to a considerable extent re-written by Lord Woolf and Professor Jowell; though it certainly retains the qualities of de Smith's original work. The authors say at paragraph 5-017: 
1,"It is a common law presumption of legislative intent that access to the Queen's courts in respect of justiciable issues is not to be denied save by clear words in a statute." 

2.The House of Lords has held the same to be true in relation to the right of freedom of  expression: Attorney-General v Guardian [1987] 1 WLR 1248 per Lord Templeman at 1296F-1297F, Attorney-General v Guardian (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 per Lord Goff at 283-4, and Derbyshire County Court v The Times [1993] AC 534 per Lord Keith of Kinkel at 551F-G
The following is an observation of Lord Diplock that is concerned with the reach of the High Court's power to control the conduct of arbitrators.He stated thus: 
3."The High Court's power to dismiss a pending action for want of prosecution is but an instance of a general power to control its own procedure so as to prevent its being used to achieve injustice. Such a power is inherent in its constitutional function as a court of justice. Every civilised system of government requires that the state should make available to all its citizens a means for the just and peaceful settlement of deputes between them as to their respective legal rights. The means provided are courts of justice to which every citizen has a constitutional right of access in the role of plaintiff to obtain the remedy to which he claims to be entitled in consequence of an alleged breach of his legal or equitable rights by some other citizen, the defendant."[ Bremer Vulkan Schiffbau Und Maschinenfabrik v South India Shipping Corporation Ltd [1981] AC 909]

R v Secretary of State, ex parte Leech [1994] QB 198 concerned a prisoner whose complaint was that correspondence with his solicitor concerning litigation in which he was involved or intended to launch was being censored by the prison authorities under the Prison Rules. The Court of Appeal held that section 47(1) of the Prison Act 1952 (which empowered the Secretary of State in general terms to make rules for the regulation of prisons and the treatment of prisoners) did not authorise a rule which created an impediment to the free flow of communication between a solicitor and client about contemplated legal proceedings. At 210A-D Steyn LJ, as he then was, giving the judgment of the court, said this: 

4."It is a principle of our law that every citizen has a right of unimpeded access to a court. In Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC 1, 13, Lord Wilberforce described it as a 'basic right'. Even in our unwritten constitution it must rank as a constitutional right. In Raymond v Honey , Lord Wilberforce said that there was nothing in the Prison Act 1952 that conferred power to 'interfere' with this right or to 'hinder' its exercise. Lord Wilberforce said that rules which did not comply with that principle would be ultra vires. Lord Elwyn-Jones and Lord Russell of Killowen agreed... It is true that Lord Wilberforce held that the rules, properly construed, were not ultra vires. But that does not affect the importance of his observations. Lord Bridge of Harwich held that the rules in question in that case were ultra vires ... he went further than Lord Wilberforce and said that a citizen's right to unimpeded access could only be taken away by express enactment ... It seems to us that Lord Wilberforce's observations rank as the ratio decidendi of the case, and we accept that such rights can as a matter of legal principle be taken away by necessary implication."  LORD CHANCELLOR EX PARTE JOHN WITHAM, R v. [1997] EWHC Admin 237 (7th March, 1997)

Common Law and Constitutionality

Common Law and Constitutional Rights
The common law does not generally speak in the language of constitutional rights, for the good reason that in the absence of any sovereign text, a written constitution which is logically and legally prior to the power of legislature, executive and judiciary alike, there is on the face of it no hierarchy of rights such that any one of them is more entrenched by the law than any other. And if the concept of a constitutional right is to have any meaning, it must surely sound in the protection which the law affords to it. Where a written constitution guarantees a right, there is no conceptual difficulty. The State authorities must give way to it, save to the extent that the constitution allows them to deny it. There may of course be other difficulties, such as whether on the constitution's true interpretation the right claimed exists at all. Even a superficial acquaintance with the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States shows that such problems may be acute. But they are not in the same category as the question: do we have constitutional rights at all? In the unwritten legal order of the British State, at a time when the common law continues to accord a legislative supremacy to Parliament, the notion of a constitutional right can in my judgment inhere only in this proposition, that the right in question cannot be abrogated by the State save by specific provision in an Act of Parliament, or by regulations whose vires in main legislation specifically confers the power to abrogate. General words will not suffice. And any such rights will be creatures of the common law, since their existence would not be the consequence of the democratic political process but would be logically prior to it. I shall explain in due course what I mean by a requirement of specific provision, a concept more elusive than it seems. LORD CHANCELLOR EX PARTE JOHN WITHAM, R v. [1997] EWHC Admin 237 (7th March, 1997) England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions After reviewing many authorities and the submissions of Counsel before him upon them Laws J continued: - "It seems to me, from all the authorities to which I have referred, that the common law has clearly given special weight to the citizen's right of access to the courts. It has been described as a constitutional right, though the cases do not explain what that means. In this whole argument nothing to my mind has been shown to displace the proposition that the executive cannot in law abrogate the right of access to justice, unless it is specifically so permitted by Parliament; and this is the meaning of the constitutional right. But I must explain, as I have indicated I would, what in my view the law requires by such a permission. A statute may give the permission expressly; in that case it would provide in terms that in defined circumstances the citizen may not enter the court door. In Ex Parte Leech [1994] QB 198 the Court of Appeal accepted, as in its view the ratio of their lordships' decision in Raymond v Honey [1983] 1.A.C.1 vouchsafed, that it could also be done by necessary implication. However for my part I find great difficulty in conceiving a form of words capable of making it plain beyond doubt to the statute's reader that the provision in question prevents him from going to court (for that is what would be required), save in a case where that is expressly stated. The class of cases where it could be done by necessary implication is, I venture to think, a class with no members." Juncal, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Ors [2007] EWHC 3024 (Admin) (19 December 2007) 
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2007/3024.html 
Cite as: [2007] EWHC 3024 (Admin), [2008] MHLR 79, [2008] ACD 28